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The Distribution of Information and the Price Efficiency of Markets
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Abstract
Apparently contradictory evidence has accumulated regarding the extent to which financial markets
are informationally efficient. Shedding new light on this old debate, we show that differences in the
distribution of private information may explain why informational efficiency can vary greatly across
markets. We find that markets are informationally efficient when complete information is
concentrated in the hands of competing insiders whereas they are less efficient when private
information is dispersed across traders. A learning model helps to illustrate why inferring others’
private information from prices takes more time when information is more dispersed. We discuss
the implications of our findings for understanding the potential consequences of lowering the cost
of information on the informational efficiency of markets.
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1. Introduction
Markets are essential to well-functioning societies. Yet, the debate regarding the efficiency of
markets is still rampant. To shed light on this conundrum, we study whether differences in the
structure of information between markets can account for the differences in their informational
efficiency. In particular, we posit that the concentration of private information across market
participants is a key determinant of the informational efficiency of a market.
Because it is impossible to clearly assess the informational efficiency of markets with archival
data (Fama, 1991), we make the methodological choice to rely upon experimental markets. A
growing number of studies have demonstrated the unique benefits of the experimental method in
allowing researchers to control and thus clearly identify the extent to which private information is
captured by market prices (e.g., Bossaerts, 2009; Frydman et al. 2014; Noussair and Tucker, 2014).
We extend the seminal work by Plott and Sunder (1988) where they find that with a complete
set of Arrow Debreu spanning securities markets are efficient information gatherers. The structure
of their environment provides a particular insight into how information is quickly and efficiently
transmitted in the market. With spanning markets, one-half of the traders are fully informed in all
but one of the markets. Thus, these markets are populated by competing insiders who will reveal
the states that cannot occur thus making the true asset value transparent to all traders.
We build on this work to assess whether the presence of insiders is indeed the driving force
leading markets to aggregate private information. We consider market experiments in which the
asset can take one of three possible values. In our markets, traders can either be uninformed,
partially informed or fully informed. The uninformed trader only knows the prior distribution of
the three possible asset values. The partially informed trader is given one private signal regarding
the value (out of the three possible ones) the asset will not take. The fully informed trader knows
with certainty the value the asset will assume at the end of the market. If markets are
informationally efficient then prices should reflect all the available private information regardless
of the distribution of private information (Fama, 1970). It follows that the presence or absence of
fully informed traders will not affect prices as long as the aggregate information of all traders in
the market is complete.
To derive conjectures regarding the informational efficiency of our experimental markets, we
rely on a learning model following the work of Friedman (1991) and Copeland and Friedman
(1987; 1991). We extend their approach to the case in which a proportion of the traders may be
2

boundedly rational. Following the work of Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015; 2018) on the
cognitive underpinnings of trading in experimental markets, we assume traders to be either
reflective, in which case they properly apply Bayes’ rule to infer the true asset value from market
orders, 1 or non-reflective in which case they exclusively rely on their private information to value
the asset. Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015) show that the distinction between reflective and
non-reflective traders is crucial for understanding the informational efficiency of markets. This
distinction echoes previous research in Finance regarding people’s limited capacity to learn others’
private information from prices (e.g., see Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2018).
Using model-based simulations, we establish several conjectures regarding the informational
efficiency of markets and learning dynamics. Keeping the number of private signals constant
across markets, the simulations indicate that informational efficiency should be higher in markets
populated by both fully informed and uninformed traders than in markets solely populated by
partially informed traders. Our simulations show that uninformed or partially informed traders
learn the true asset value substantially faster when fully informed traders are present in the market.
Intuitively, orders involving fully informed traders carry substantially more information than
orders involving partially informed traders thus facilitating Bayesian inference and the
transmission of private information into prices. Fully informed traders provide a clear signal of the
asset’s price relative to its true value as they follow a riskless strategy of buying (selling) when the
price is below (above) the true value. 2 Our simulations also predict that the efficiency of markets
will increase and trading volumes will decrease as the number of fully informed traders rises.
Finally, our simulations also deliver a point prediction according to which a market populated with
at least three fully informed traders should reach a higher level of informational efficiency than a
market populated entirely by partially informed traders.
Our experimental findings provide clear-cut support for our conjectures including our point
prediction. Our experimental results also support our model by showing that markets populated by
a higher number of reflective traders (assessed using the cognitive reflection test, Frederick, 2005)
reach higher levels of informational efficiency.

1

We define the term “market order” to include bids, asks, and contract prices rather than to distinguish between limit
orders and immediately executable orders. As such, throughout the manuscript this term includes not only transaction
prices but also “limit orders”.
2
Unlike the works of Hanson, Oprea and Porter (2006) and Veiga and Vorsatz (2010), our simulated traders do not
engage in strategic manipulations of the market.
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2. Contribution to previous literature
Efficient Market Hypothesis
Our findings show that the distribution of private information has a significant effect on the
informational efficiency of the market. This may explain why some markets have been found to be
informationally efficient whereas others have not (e.g., Fama, 2008). 3 Future research should assess
whether there is, at least, some correlational evidence between the presence of insiders in stock
markets and their informational efficiency. Our study can thus be seen as a starting point for
reconciling the seemingly contradictory pieces of evidence fueling the debate between classical and
behavioral finance.
Because our findings are based on experimental markets, we are able to identify the causal effect
of the distribution of information on the informational efficiency of markets thus making our
findings immune to the usual data-mining critique (e.g., Fama, 2008). We have isolated the
distribution of private information as a systematic factor influencing the informational efficiency of
markets.
Models of Informational Efficiency
Our experimental data are consistent with the predictions of our learning model thus providing
further support for the work of Friedman (1991) which stressed the need for a simplification of the
modeling of continuous double auctions settings to abstract away from game-theoretic
dimensions. 4
At the same time, our findings are also compatible with the implications of the noisy rational
expectation equilibrium (NREE) models (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Hellwig, 1980;
Diamond and Verrecchia 1981; Brennan and Cao, 1996) regarding ‘signal amplification’ and the
fact that prices do not perfectly reflect the true asset value (see Bossaerts, Frydman and Ledyard,
2013). It is worth noting that our learning model shares an important feature with NREE models
as it considers two types of traders who differ in their level of sophistication. In both models, one
type of trader fails to learn from asset prices whereas the other type of trader uses Bayesian
updating. Our model differs, however, from NREE as non-reflective traders use their private
information and thus do not randomly submit orders. More importantly, our approach differs from

3

See also the dialogue between Eugene Fama and Richard Thaler:
http://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2016/video/are-markets-efficient
4
In continuous double auctions, traders can submit, at any time, offers to buy or sell the asset. Traders can also accept
current offers to buy or sell an asset.
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NREE in its aim of modeling a continuous double auction market that mimics the experimental
markets which we subsequently use to test our main conjectures. We thus trade off the strategic
concerns inherent to the equilibrium approach with the applicability of our model to the complex
environment of continuous double auctions. 5 Because our ultimate goal is to test our conjectures
in a laboratory setting, we identify our two different types of traders using simple cognitive tests.
This is achieved by establishing a direct correspondence between the two types of traders and a
specific cognitive skill (in our case we consider cognitive reflection as measured by the Cognitive
Reflection Test, Frederick, 2005). This link between traders’ types and cognitive reflection has
previously been established by Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015; 2018). Because noise traders
in NREE are typically introduced for convenience in order to prevent the application of the notrade theorem, they are treated as a ‘black box’. Our research can thus be seen as an attempt to
open the ‘black box’ and provide a cognitive profile for these traders so as to assess the extent to
which they populate actual market settings.
Experimental Finance
Lab and field experiments on information aggregation have mainly focused on institutional aspects
of informational efficiency (e.g., Plott, Wit and Yang, 2003). For example, the work of Plott and
Sunder (1988) led to the idea that information aggregation was more easily achieved in markets in
which a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities was available. In Plott and Sunder (1988) ArrowDebreu securities markets, the traded asset had a positive value only if one of three possible states
occurred. It follows that traders receiving a signal that a given state cannot occur become de facto
fully informed that the Arrow-Debreu security associated with that state is worthless. They can thus
sell that security to secure a profit at no risk. Thus, in the Plott and Sunder (1988) setting, ArrowDebreu securities transform a market in which traders are originally partially informed into a market
in which half of the traders are fully informed and half are uninformed. Our findings shed light on
Plott and Sunder’s (1982, 1988) results that Arrow-Debreu securities facilitate the aggregation of
information because these securities create markets in which some traders are fully informed and
private information is less dispersed. 6

5

Trying to do both at the same time has had limited success (see e.g., Cason and Friedman, 1996 for a discussion).
Our work also relates to a strand of the literature that focuses on other institutional features of markets such as the
existence of, as well as the level of competition between, market makers (Cason, 2000; Krahnen and Weber, 1999,
2001), the existence of dark markets (Asparouhova and Bossaerts, 2017) and the presence of futures markets
(Friedman, Harrison and Salmon, 1984).
6
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Our work directly relates to a number of studies which have assessed the effect of the timing of
information release on the informational efficiency of markets. Copeland and Friedman (1987), as
well as Barner, Feri and Plott, (2005), have extended the original experiments of Plott and Sunder
(1982) to different structures of information including sequential information release. Their findings
generally suggest that the sequential arrival of information tends to hamper informational efficiency.
Also, asset markets in which traders make sequential decisions and in which traders’ decision times
are random have been found to generate information cascades in which some private information
fails to be transmitted to prices (Nöth and Weber, 2003). 7
The complexity of the informational structure has also been found to affect the informational
efficiency of markets. Plott, Wit and Yang (2003) find that information aggregation is less
pronounced in settings in which pooling all private traders’ information does not unveil the true asset
value with certainty. In addition to aggregate uncertainty, Camerer and Weigelt (1991) show that the
nature of the private signals plays an important role in the informational efficiency of markets. The
authors show that private information may fail to aggregate in cases in which traders do not know
with certainty whether half the market is composed of insiders. O’Brien and Srivastava (1991) find
that asset prices do not converge to fundamentals in an environment with multiple assets in which
asset valuation can depend upon a previous realization of dividends.
In line with previous research, our model and our experimental data show that market complexity,
whether it arises from the complexity of the information structure or other institutional features, is a
crucial ingredient to understanding the informational efficiency of markets.
Finally, our paper largely builds on the work of Bossaerts, Frydman and Ledyard (2013) who
compare the informational efficiency of markets populated with different numbers of fully informed
traders. They find evidence for ‘signal amplification’ as prices tended to reflect the true value more
closely as the number of fully informed traders in the market increased. In addition to replicating
their findings for markets populated with fully informed traders, we extend their work by comparing
the informational efficiency of market environments that only differ in the dispersion of information.

7

Other works have focused on the presence of manipulators who could distort prices and hamper the informational
efficiency of the market (Hanson, Oprea and Porter, 2006; Veiga and Vorsatz, 2009, 2010). Hanson, Oprea and Porter
(2006) incentivized manipulators to distort market prices but find that they were ultimately unable to affect informational
efficiency. Veiga and Vorsatz (2009, 2010) used computerized market manipulators and showed that these operators
could distort asset prices.

6

In doing so, we show, using both a learning model and experimental markets, that concentrating
private information tends to promote informational efficiency.
3. Model and conjectures
Following Friedman (1991), our model assumes that traders do not strategically place orders. We
thus posit an intermediate level of sophistication in the modeling of agents interacting in a continuous
double auction setting. At the lower end of the sophistication spectrum is the zero-intelligence model
of Gode and Sunder (1993) which only constrains traders’ behavior to avoid trading at a loss. In this
model, traders do not update their beliefs regarding the true asset value in contrast to Friedman
(1991). At the upper end of the sophistication spectrum are the game-theoretic double auction
models in which traders are assumed to behave strategically (e.g., Wilson, 1987). However, these
models have been found to underperform less sophisticated models in explaining traders’ behavior
in double auction market experiments (e.g., Cason and Friedman, 1996). Based on the current state
of the literature we thus employ a modeling approach similar to Friedman (1991) as such models
have been found to be the most successful in explaining experimental data. In this setting, traders
establish their beliefs regarding the true asset value based on observed market orders. Traders then
follow a reservation-price strategy that consists of buying (selling) the asset whenever the price is
below (above) their belief of the true asset value.
3.1. Model
3.1.1. Trading and information
Even though we present our model for the specific parameters used in our experiments (see
Section 4 for the experimental design), it is important to note that our findings apply more
generally. In Section 5.3.1, we stress test the model by assessing the robustness of our conjectures
to different distributions of the asset value. We also consider the robustness of our findings to
different cash and shares endowments as well as to the case of markets populated by a larger
number of traders.
Our model allows for a market populated with traders possessing different levels of private
information. Depending on the market design, traders can be either uninformed, partially informed
or fully informed. In particular, we take the parameters of Market 9 from Plott and Sunder (1988)
as our baseline. This market is populated by 12 partially informed traders who receive the same
endowment of cash (1,200) and shares (4). The asset value can only take one of three possible
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values: 50, 240 or 490 with probabilities 35%, 45% and 20%, respectively. 8 Half of the partially
informed traders receive one private signal regarding which possible value the asset could not take
(e.g., “Not 50”) whereas the other half of the partially informed traders receive the other possible
signal (e.g., “Not 240”) so that the aggregate information available to traders in the market was
complete. Building on this market design, we then consider the case in which the market is
populated by both uninformed and fully informed traders (see e.g., Plott and Sunder, 1982, or
Bossaerts, Frydman and Ledyard, 2013). An uninformed trader does not receive a private signal,
while a fully informed trader receives two different signals (e.g., “Not 50”; “Not 240”) thus making
the true asset value (e.g., 490) clear.
One caveat of the market design we employ is that the asset value is the same for all traders
implying no gains from trade and thus no trade in a rational expectation equilibrium. Our approach
thus focuses on the informational efficiency of markets rather than on the allocative efficiency of
markets. We made this choice purposefully as we intend to first consider a setting in which
information aggregation had been evidenced (Treatment C in Plott and Sunder, 1988) rather than
considering the case in which gains from trade exist but information aggregation failed to be
observed (Treatment A in Plott and Sunder, 1988). Notwithstanding, the conjectures derived from
our model simulations appear to be robust to all treatments and all specifications used in Plott and
Sunder (1988) including markets in which gains from exchange exist (see Section 5.3.1). Finally,
while the no trade theorem may technically apply to our market design, the extensive literature in
experimental markets shows that trade does indeed occur even in the absence of gains from trade
(e.g., Palan, 2013; Noussair and Tucker, 2014). One possible reason for this is the existence of
noise (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) or boundedly rational traders (e.g., Friedman, 1991;
Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; Peng and Xiong, 2006; Esponda, 2008; Eyster and Rabin, 2005;
Mondria, 2010; Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2015; Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp, 2016; Vives and Yang, 2017; Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2018) who fail to
immediately infer others’ private information from prices. 9

8

The other two specifications (Markets 7 and 8) by Plott and Sunder (1988) used in this treatment are almost identical.
These markets are such that the probabilities of occurrence of each of the three possible values are the same. Market
7 uses the same three values as Market 9 (50, 240 and 490) whereas Market 8 uses values 125, 375 and 525. The
authors did not report any differences across these markets. Importantly, the conjectures we derive from our
simulations are robust to alternate specifications (see Section 5.3.1).
9
Risk-sharing motives may also be a reason to trade in our markets if all private information is not captured in the
price in which case no risk remains.
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Our model reproduces the decentralized continuous double auction mechanism used in the
experimental markets. 10 At the beginning of each market, a trader (selected at random) posts a bidask spread. A second trader is then selected and given the option to either accept the current bid or
ask or improve the bid-ask spread. 11,12 Traders (selected at random) continue to improve the bid-ask
spread until a trade occurs. 13 If a trade occurs, then the price, 𝑝𝑝, is set at the current best bid (or ask)
and the trading book is updated. 14

The decision to improve the bid-ask spread or trade depends on a trader’s belief regarding the
true asset value. Specifically, a trader will improve the current bid-ask spread if her belief lies
within the current spread. In that case, the updated bid (ask) will be drawn from a uniform
distribution between the current bid (ask) and the trader’s belief. If traders’ beliefs are below
(above) the current best bid (ask), then they would sell (buy) the asset. This trading strategy can
be seen as an example of a reservation-price strategy (see Friedman, 1991). In our model, the
reservation-price strategy consists of trading according to a trader’s current belief of the true asset
value. While this strategy can only be justified if we assume risk neutrality for the traders, this
assumption is widely used in double auction models (see Copeland and Friedman, 1987; Friedman,
1991) as well as in game-theoretic microstructure models (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle,
1985). 15
Similar to our experimental design, trading follows a bid-ask improvement rule. In our market
environment, traders observe market prices as well as bids and asks. We thus assume that traders
can use all market orders (bids, asks and contract prices) to update their beliefs.
3.1.2. Reflective and non-reflective traders

10

A market maker (or a specialist) is commonly utilized in the market microstructure literature (e.g., Glosten and
Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). In order to mimic our experimental design as closely as possible we do
not include a market maker in our model.
11
A bid-ask spread is only updated when the newly selected trader has enough cash (shares) to cover the bid (ask)
position. In line with our experimental markets, traders are not permitted to sell short or borrow funds. Moreover,
when a trader is selected to act, the trader first removes any bids or asks from the order book that are inconsistent with
the trader’s current belief of the asset value. For example, if the trader previously submitted a bit that is now greater
than her current belief, then this bid is automatically canceled. Note that traders in our experimental markets also had
the ability to cancel orders.
12
Our model differs from Friedman (1991) as the randomly selected trader is forced to act, if possible. Thus, the trader
cannot choose to not act in an attempt to gain better terms of trade.
13
The sequence of trades is not random, however. Traders either will or will not trade at a given bid-ask spread
depending upon their current belief regarding the true asset value.
14
The accepted bid/ask is removed from the book, and the next best bid/ask, if one exists, becomes the current best
bid/ask. We thus consider the case of an open book similar to our experimental design (see Section 4).
15
The zero-intelligence model of Gode and Sunder (1993) also disregards issues related to risk attitudes.
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Even though current learning models in which all traders use Bayes’ rule have had some success
in explaining data in experimental markets with double auctions, they still ‘leave much to be desired’
(Cason and Friedman, 1996, page 1332). The authors point to a promising direction (page 1333) by
stating: “Given that the most ‘rational’ of available models did not perform especially well on its
‘home turf’, perhaps the most appropriate next step is to explore new models that incorporate
significant bounded rationality.” Following this suggestion, we populate our market with traders
who fail to apply Bayes’ rule to learn from market orders. 16 We consider a model in which
heterogeneous agents interact in the market. In particular, we assume our traders to be either
reflective or non-reflective. Reflective traders apply Bayes’ rule to infer the true asset value as they
observe market orders. We use the term reflective for these traders as the failure to use Bayes’ rule
to update beliefs on the face of new information has been closely connected to ones’ cognitive
reflection capacity (e.g., Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz, 2009; Campitelli and Labollita, 2010;
Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011; Lesage, Navarrete and De Neys, 2013; Toplak, West and Stanovich,
2011, 2014; Sirota, Juanchich and Hagmayer, 2014; Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2015, 2018) as
measured by Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test (henceforth, CRT).
Non-reflective traders only update their beliefs once, on the basis of their private information, and
do not use market data to infer other traders’ private information. These identifying characteristics
are consistent with several important models in the literature: the Walrasian model (Lintner, 1969),
the no revelation of expectations model (Copeland and Friedman, 1987; 1991), models stressing
investors’ inattention and information processing costs (e.g., Peng and Xiong, 2006; Mondria, 2010;
Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2016; Vives and Yang, 2017), the behavioral
equilibrium model (Esponda, 2008) and the cursed equilibrium model (Eyster and Rabin, 2005;
Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos, 2018).

16

This can be seen as being inspired from quasi-Bayesian learning models such as Daniel, Hirshleifer and
Subrahmanyam (1998) and Rabin (2002). Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) account for stock market
under- and over-reaction to news by developing a model in which traders overvalue the precision of their private
information and update their beliefs self-servingly by downplaying information which may not be consistent with their
prior beliefs. Rabin (2002) considers the case in which investors assign too much weight to small samples to account
for stock market under- and over-reaction to news. Both Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Rabin
(2002) build their models on extensive cognitive psychology literature showing that people largely fail to apply Bayes’
rule suffering instead from a number of common and long-lasting biases (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974;
Stanovich, 2009; Kahneman, 2011).
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According to the Walrasian and the no revelation of expectations models, traders make decisions
based on their private information and fail to infer other traders’ information from market prices. 17
The behavior of traders in these models as well as in models of investors’ inattention closely relates
to the widely-documented phenomenon of the winner’s curse (Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983;
Thaler, 1988, 1991). The winner’s curse occurs when auction participants fail to anticipate the
informational content of other individuals’ bids and end up paying too much for the auctioned item.
Applied to financial markets, Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2018) refer to those who “neglect the
informational content of prices” as cursed traders.
3.1.3. Learning
In our model, learning occurs after each market event. Market events either correspond to an
improvement of the bid-ask spread or to a transaction. Based on these market events, reflective
traders can update their beliefs regarding the true asset value by applying Bayes’ rule to infer other
traders’ private information. Each event corresponds to one of the following actions: (1) best bid
𝜂𝜂

is accepted; (2) best ask is accepted; or (3) the bid-ask spread is improved. Let 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛,𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 represent the

belief of trader 𝑗𝑗 of type 𝜂𝜂 after event 𝑛𝑛, which is denoted by {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}. Trader types, 𝜂𝜂 = 𝜏𝜏 × 𝑠𝑠,

identify whether the trader is reflective or not (𝜏𝜏 = 𝑅𝑅 or 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) as well as the signal the trader
received (𝑠𝑠 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 50, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 240 or 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 490 for partially informed traders and 𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼 or 𝑈𝑈 for

informed or uninformed traders).

Reflective traders update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule with 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {50,240,490} as follows:
𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠
𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠
, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}�=∑𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃 �𝑣𝑣 = 𝑖𝑖|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}� × 𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1

𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠
represents the prior belief of the trader with the signal “𝑠𝑠” and 𝑣𝑣 is the true asset
where 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1

value. 18

In Appendix B, we detail the Bayesian learning procedure to calculate 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅,𝑠𝑠 for each of the three

possible types of events. We then use these detailed procedures to simulate our model.

3.1.4. Model example

17

It is important to note that the two models differ because traders are myopic in the Walrasian model whereas they
trade based on equilibrium prices in the no revelation of expectations model.
18
Note that informed reflective traders do not update their belief as they already know the true asset value.
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To illustrate the intuition behind the model’s learning mechanism, consider the following simple
example. Suppose the true asset value is 490. Also, assume all traders are reflective and that this
assumption is commonly known by all traders. The fully informed traders know the true asset value,
i.e. 𝜇𝜇0𝑅𝑅,𝐼𝐼 = 490, while the uninformed traders’ belief of the asset value is 𝜇𝜇0𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 223.5 (= 0.35 ×

50 + 0.45 × 240 + 0.20 × 490). Consider the following market events.
First market event: bid-ask spread improvement: 200-360

The initial event is always an improvement of the bid-ask spread because the book is empty. This
is equivalent to assuming that the initial bid-ask spread is 50-490, i.e. the minimum-maximum
possible value of the asset. The fully informed traders do not update their beliefs; however, the
uninformed reflective traders must update their belief regarding the likelihood of occurrence of each
of the three values of the asset by determining the probability of occurrence of the first market event
given the asset value is either 50, 240 or 490. If the true value was 50 or 490, then this new bid-ask
pair (200-360) could only have been submitted by another uninformed trader. Indeed, since traders
follow a reservation price strategy based upon their belief, if the true value is 50 (490), then fully
informed traders could not submit a bid (ask) above (below) 50 (490). If the true value was 240, then
any trader could have generated this first event. Thus, while the uninformed reflective traders revise
their initial belief of 223.5, they do not significantly alter it based upon this event, i.e. 𝜇𝜇1𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 218.7.
Second market event: trade at 360

A trader can only accept the current best ask if their belief is greater than the ask value. This implies
that this ask must have been accepted by an informed trader with the belief of 490 because
uninformed reflective traders hold a belief of 218.7. Thus, the uninformed reflective trader learns
from the second market event that the true asset value is 490.
This example illustrates how quickly uninformed reflective traders can learn in the presence of
fully informed traders. In the absence of fully informed traders in the market, uninformed reflective
traders could not have determined the true asset value as early as the second market event. Inclusion
of non-reflective traders will tend to slow this process down as non-reflective uninformed traders
will stick to their initial belief of 223.5 thus preventing reflective traders to learn any private
information from the market orders submitted by these non-reflective traders.

3.2. Conjectures
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We conduct simulations of the learning model to derive a series of conjectures that can be tested
experimentally. Each simulation is conducted with the same number of traders (12), and the same
endowment of cash (1,200 francs) and shares (4) used in the original setting of Plott and Sunder
(1988) which will be the basis for our experiments (see Section 5.3.1 for robustness checks with
different parameter values). A total of 25,000 simulations were run for (each of the) various
combinations of two exogenous model parameters. The first parameter corresponds to the asset value
𝑣𝑣 ∈ {50, 240, 490}. The second parameter is the proportion of reflective traders (𝛼𝛼 ∈ {0,
3

12

1

2

, ,

12 12

, … ,1}) in the market which we assume to be common information known by all traders. Each

simulation runs until 30 trades have been executed so as to achieve a trading volume comparable to
experimental markets using a similar design (see Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2018). 19
Our first conjecture compares informational efficiency in markets that differ in the relative
number of partially informed, fully informed and uninformed traders. However, we hold the
number of private signals in each market constant. Thus, we are able to compare, for example, a
market with 12 partially informed traders (each endowed with one signal) to a market with 6 fully
informed (each endowed with two signals) and 6 uninformed (not endowed with a signal) traders.
Our simulations show that markets populated by both fully informed and uninformed traders are
more informationally efficient than markets solely populated by partially informed traders. To
show this, we measure the informational efficiency of a market by calculating the absolute distance
between a market price and the true asset value for each transaction in a given simulation. We then
take the mean of this measure over a given simulation. Averaging this mean value across all 25,000
simulations yields the mean absolute deviation (MAD) for a given distribution of private
information. In Figure 1, we compare MAD values between a market populated by 100% (50%)
partially informed traders with a market populated by 50% (25%) fully informed traders and the
rest uninformed traders. 20 In both comparisons, the number of private signals is identical between
the market with partially informed traders and the market with fully informed traders. We observe
that informational efficiency, which is inversely related to MAD values, is highest in markets with
fully informed traders compared to markets with partially informed traders.

19
Our results are, however, robust to different stopping rules including stopping a simulation after either 5 or 60
transactions (results available upon request from the authors).
20
We will follow this naming convention for the remainder of the manuscript. That is, if the title of a specific
simulation or experimental treatment does not explicitly identify all traders, then it is assumed that the unnamed traders
are uninformed.
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Figure 1 also shows, in line with our model, that the informational efficiency of markets
increases (MAD values decrease) as the proportion of reflective traders in the market increases.

Figure 1. These figures represent the mean absolute price deviation from the true asset value in
simulated markets. In the left panel, we compare a market populated by 100% partially informed
traders and a market populated by 50% fully informed traders. In both markets, the number of private
signals is identical and equal to 12. In the right panel, we compare a market populated by 50%
partially informed traders to a market populated by 25% fully informed traders. In both markets, the
number of private signals is identical and equal to 6. MAD values are averaged across all three asset
values, 50, 240 and 490.
In addition, the informational efficiency is similar in the market populated by 100% partially
informed traders (MAD = 72.8) and the market populated by only 25% fully informed traders (MAD
= 71.4). This holds even though there are twice as many private signals in the market with partially
informed traders (12 signals) than in the market with 25% fully informed traders (6 signals). We
investigate this further by comparing the informational efficiency of the market in which all traders
are partially informed with markets populated by different proportions of fully informed traders
(with all other traders uninformed). In Figure 2, we show that a market populated by 100% partially
informed traders is less informationally efficient than a market populated by only 25% (3 out of 12)
fully informed traders whereas it is more efficient than a market populated by 17% (2 out of 12) fully
informed traders. Even though the MAD values reported in Figure 2 correspond to averages across
all possible proportions of reflective traders in the market, the ordering of the different markets holds
for each of the possible proportions of reflective traders. It follows that the qualitative nature of
Conjecture 1b, 1c and 1d does not hinge upon the proportion of non-reflective traders in the market.
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Figure 2. These bar charts represent the mean absolute price deviation from the true asset value
(averaged across all possible proportions of reflective traders in the markets), for different numbers
of partially and fully informed traders. MAD values are averaged across all three asset values, 50,
240 and 490.
Figure 2 also highlights, in line with NREE models (see Bossaerts, Frydman and Ledyard, 2013,
Hypothesis 3), that the increase in the number of fully informed traders will lead to an increase in the
informational efficiency of market prices, which is in line with the idea of ‘signal amplification’.
Based on these simulations, we derive the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1. (Informational Efficiency of Markets)
a) The higher the proportion of reflective traders in the market the higher the informational
efficiency of the market.
b) Markets with the same number of private signals are more informationally efficient when
signals are concentrated in the hands of fully informed traders rather than dispersed across
partially informed traders.
c) The higher the number of fully informed traders in a market the higher the informational
efficiency of the market.
d) Markets with two (three) fully informed traders should be less (more) informationally efficient
than markets in which all traders are partially informed.
Markets populated by different proportions of fully informed traders not only vary in the
informational efficiency of prices but also in trading volumes. By construction, simulations were
stopped after 30 transactions. 21 Thus, we assess trading intensity (rather than volume) by

21
While the primary stopping criteria for the simulations was 30 transactions, simulations also halted if (i) 10,000
iterations of the simulation occurred or (ii) 1,000 iterations passed without an event. One iteration of the simulation
corresponds to the random selection of a trader and that trader’s action: improve the bid/ask spread, accept the current
best bid or ask, or nothing. So, if the simulation randomly selected a trader who did not update the bid-ask spread or
accept the current best bid or ask 1,000 consecutive times, then the simulation halted in order to avoid an infinite loop.
The assumption is that (i) traders were unable to trade at this point due to a lack of cash/shares or (ii) traders beliefs’

15

calculating the average number of transactions that occur within a block of five iterations in each
simulation. In Figure 3, we show that trading intensity decreases as the number of fully informed
traders in the market increases (see last four bar charts). This likely holds because, as the number
of informed traders increases, prices move closer to the true asset value. This implies that a trader’s
belief regarding the asset value is more likely to be aligned with other traders’ beliefs. Because the
discrepancy in traders’ beliefs drives trading, markets in which private information is more likely
to be aggregated generate fewer transactions.
We also show that trading intensity is lower for markets in which all traders are partially
informed compared to markets populated by less than 50% fully informed traders. Finally, trading
intensity is essentially identical for the 100% partially informed market and the market populated
by 50% fully informed traders. These findings form the basis for Conjecture 2.

Figure 3. These bar charts represent trading intensity (averaged across all possible proportions of
reflective traders in the markets, across all 25,000 simulations and across all three asset values) for
different types of markets which differ in the number of partially and fully informed traders. Trading
intensity is calculated as the average number of transactions completed in a market for blocks of five
iterations of the algorithm.

Conjecture 2. (Trading volumes)
a) Trading intensity is lower for markets in which all traders are partially informed compared
to markets populated by less than 50% fully informed traders.
b) Trading intensity is the same for the 100% partially informed market and the market
populated by 50% fully informed traders.
c) Trading intensity decreases as the number of fully informed traders in the market increases.
4. Experimental design
were close enough to the true value that they were unable to update the spread. Note that a bid-ask spread of was not
allowed to be an empty interval.
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To test our conjectures, we use experimental markets that have the same characteristics as those
described in our model simulations. We consider a market setting in which subjects could trade an
experimental asset that can only take three possible values: 50, 240 or 490 francs (each franc was
worth $0.001) with probabilities 35%, 45% and 20%, respectively. Trading takes place using a
computerized continuous double auction mechanism. 22 We conduct a total of 5 treatments using a
between-subject design. Treatments only vary in the distribution of private signals across traders.
In the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment, each of the 12 traders in the market is privately
informed of a value the asset could not take. As half of the traders were given one signal (e.g.,
“Not 50”) and the other half were given the other possible signal (e.g., “Not 240”), the aggregate
information available to traders in the market was complete.
We contrast the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment with four ‘fully informed’ treatments in
which information is concentrated in the hands of a few fully informed traders with all other traders
uninformed. 23 From the point of view of the amount of aggregate information, the ‘100% partially
informed’ treatment and the ‘fully informed’ treatments do not differ. In all cases, the aggregate
information reveals the true asset value. To test our conjectures, we consider ‘fully informed’
treatments in which the number of fully informed traders is either 2, 3, 4 or 6.
We recruited a total of 418 individuals from a subject pool of more than 1,500 individuals at a
major Western US University. We conducted a total of 35 sessions. Ten sessions were conducted
for both the ‘100% partially informed’ and the ‘50% fully informed’ treatments. Five sessions were
conducted for each of the other three treatments. We conducted twice as many sessions for the first
two treatments as they are the key treatments for the testing of our conjectures given that the total
number of private signals (12) is the same in both markets.
Each market was composed of 12 traders. 24 In line with our model, traders were endowed with
1,200 francs in cash and 4 shares of the asset. Each session consisted of 17 markets with independent
draws for the asset value. 25

22

The experiment was conducted using Zocalo which is an open-source software used for experimental markets.
In the ‘fully informed’ treatments the informed traders receive two signals (e.g., if the true value is 240, then these
traders receive the signal “Not 50” as well as the signal “Not 490”).
24
Two sessions in the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment were conducted with 11 traders due to an elevated number of
last-minute cancellations.
25
We used the same draw for all sessions to facilitate comparisons across sessions. This draw corresponds to the asset
values used in Market 9 of Plott and Sunder (1988).
23
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Before the trading phase of each session started, subjects completed a training exercise regarding
a random device (a spinning wheel) that represented the probabilistic distribution of the true asset
value (50, 240 or 490 francs). During the training, subjects had to predict the outcome of the
spinning wheel over 10 trials (see online Appendix O1, Instructions Part 1). Each correct
prediction was rewarded 25 cents, and each incorrect answer incurred a 10-cent penalty. The
instructions concluded with a comprehension quiz and took approximately 20 minutes for subjects
to complete. Average earnings (including a $7 show-up payment) for the two and one-half hours
experiments were equal to $48.
At the end of all experimental sessions, we elicited demographic information and evaluated
subjects’ level of cognitive reflection using a 7-item version of the test developed by Frederick
(2005) (see Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2014). We also collected theory of mind scores (see
Baron-Cohen et al. 1997) (see Appendix D for a description of the survey). As is standard in the
literature, these tests were not incentivized; however, subjects received $3 for completion of the
survey.
5. Experimental Results
We test our conjectures sequentially, starting with an analysis of informational efficiency and
then volumes.
5.1. Informational efficiency of markets
The top panel of Figure 4 illustrates the sharp difference in asset prices between our ‘100%
partially informed’ treatment and our ‘50% fully informed’ treatment thus providing support for
Conjecture 1b. 26 The bottom panel of Figure 4 illustrates that, in line with Conjecture 1c, prices are
closer to the true asset values as the number of fully informed traders increases in the market.

26

In Appendix E, we show the graphs of market prices for each experimental session.
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Figure 4. Top Panel. Average price per minute over the 10 sessions for each of the seventeen markets in
the ‘100% partially informed’ (solid blue line with square markers) and the ‘50% fully informed’ treatments
(dash-dot red line). Bottom Panel. Average price per minute for the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment is
repeated along with the average price per minute over the five sessions for each of the seventeen markets
in the ‘17% fully informed’ (solid green line with square markers), ‘25% fully informed’ (solid cyan line
with triangle markers) and ‘33% fully informed’ (solid magenta line) treatments. The true asset value is
denoted in parentheses at the bottom of each subfigure and is represented by a solid (black) horizontal line.

We assess the statistical significance of our findings in the regression reported in Table 1.
Coefficients of the treatment dummy variables should be interpreted as positive or negative effects
19

with respect to the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment for which we omitted the dummy variable.
In these regressions, we use treatment dummies which take value one when a market was conducted
under the corresponding treatment and value zero otherwise. To assess Conjecture 1a, we also
control for the proportion of reflective traders in the market. To that end, we make use of the
cognitive reflection test as a way to assess how reflective a trader is. An individual’s score on the
CRT, as a measure of cognitive reflection, is a key determinant of her capacity to properly use Bayes’
rule (see Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter, 2015; 2018).
We consider a trader to be reflective (non-reflective) when her score is above (below) the median
CRT scores of all 418 subjects who participated in this study. Alternately, in regression [2] we
control for the average CRT score of all traders in a given session. 27 We also control for the true
asset value in a given market and for the number of market periods in which the trader has
participated (Market number variable). The negative and significant coefficient of the proportion
of reflective traders (see regression [1]), as well as the negative and significant coefficient of the
average trader’s CRT score in a session (see regression [2]), confirm Conjecture 1a. Indeed, both
variables are negatively related to our measure of informational efficiency (MAD). We confirm
Conjecture 1b because the coefficient for the Dummy ‘50% fully informed’ is negative and
significant (see regressions [1] and [2]) showing that informational efficiency is higher when half
of the traders receive two signals than when all traders receive only one signal. This finding is
actually consistent with the recent results of Barreda et al. (2017) who reported, in an experimental
setup in which private signals provide probabilistic clues for the true value of the asset, that prices
are closer to the fundamental value when the signals are concentrated in the hands of ‘quasiinsiders’ rather than dispersed across traders. We also find support for Conjecture 1c through
regression [3] as the coefficient on the number of fully informed traders is negative and significant.
Finally, we support Conjecture 1d because the coefficient for the Dummy ‘17% fully informed’ is
positive and significant whereas the coefficient for Dummy ‘25% fully informed’ is negative and
significant in regressions [1] and [2]. This implies that markets in which all traders are partially
informed are more efficient than markets with two fully informed traders but less efficient than
those with three fully informed traders.
Table 1. Random effects panel regression of MAD values per market as a function of cognitive
reflection and treatment dummies
27

In line with Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2018), we also find that traders earnings are positively related to
individual CRT scores (see Table A2 in Appendix A).
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MAD

Only treatments with fully
informed traders

All treatments

Specification:
Dummy ‘17% fully informed’

Dummy ‘25% fully informed’

Dummy ‘33% fully informed’

Dummy ‘50% fully informed’

[1]

[2]

[3]

13.592***

14.222***

-

(4.963)

(4.902)

-14.477*

-16.158**

(8.128)

(8.141)

-26.636**

-26.482**

(10.636)

(10.627)

-66.824***

-69.518***

(7.200)

(6.194)

-

-

Number of fully informed

-

-

-

-19.237***
(2.223)

Proportion of reflective traders

-35.560*

-

-

-14.910***

-

(19.802)
Average CRT score of traders

-

in a session

(4.443)

Market number

-0.196

-0.196

-1.138

(0.589)

(0.589)

(0.733)

0.131***

0.131***

0.128***

(0.027)

(0.028)

(0.0328)

110.824***

137.784***

158.024***

(11.762)

(16.400)

(14.869)

595 (35)

595 (35)

425 (25)

Prob > χ

0.000

0.000

0.000

R²

0.186

0.190

0.198

True asset value

Intercept

Observations (sessions)
2

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.

5.2. Trading volumes (Conjecture 2)
In Figure 5, we report, in line with Conjecture 2a, that trading volumes are lower for markets
populated by 100% partially informed traders compared to all markets in which less than 50%
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fully informed traders were present. In line with Conjecture 2b, trading volumes appear to be
similar between markets populated by 100% partially informed traders and markets populated by
50% fully informed traders. By contrast with Conjecture 2c, trading volumes do not linearly
decrease in the number of fully informed traders because markets with 33% fully informed traders
exhibit unexpectedly high volumes. However, trading volumes are lower for markets with 50%
fully informed traders compared to markets with only 17%, 25% or 33% fully informed traders.

Figure 5. These bar charts represent trading volumes for different types of markets which differ in the
number of partially and fully informed traders.

In Table 2, we replicate the analysis of Table 1 with trading volumes as the dependent variable.
In regressions [1] and [2], coefficients of the treatment dummy variables should be interpreted as
positive or negative effects with respect to the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment for which we
omitted the dummy variable. In regression [4], all treatment dummy variables are omitted with the
exception of the one corresponding to the ‘33% fully informed’ treatment. We find support for
Conjecture 2a, because the coefficient for the Dummies ‘17% fully informed’, ‘25% fully informed’
and ‘33% fully informed’ are all positive (see regressions [1] and [2]). These coefficients are also
statistically significant with the exception of the Dummy ‘25% fully informed’. In line with
Conjecture 2b, the coefficient for the Dummy ‘50% fully informed’ is either non-significant (see
regression [1]) or negative and marginally significant (see regression [2], p-value = 0.088). We
find mixed support for Conjecture 2c. In regression [3] the coefficient for the number of fully
informed traders in a market is negatively and significantly associated with trading volumes, which
supports Conjecture 2c. However, given Figure 5, we further explored this issue with regression
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[4]. Here we see that trading volumes are higher in markets with ‘33% fully informed’ traders
compared to all the other markets which is at odds with Conjecture 2c.
Table 2. Random effects panel regression of trading volumes per market as a function of
cognitive reflection and treatment dummies
Trading volumes
All treatments
Only treatments with fully informed traders
Specification:
Dummy ‘17% fully
informed’
Dummy ‘25% fully
informed’
Dummy ‘33% fully
informed’
Dummy ‘50% fully
informed’
Number of fully informed

[1]
9.380**
(3.993)
9.286
(6.809)
28.514***
(7.884)
-6.324
(4.623)
-

[2]
11.173***
(4.228)
7.114
(6.427)
26.112***
(7.614)
-7.099*
(4.153)
-

Proportion of reflective
traders
Average CRT score of
traders in a session
Market number

-29.792**
(13.996)
-

-

True asset value
Intercept
Observations (sessions)
Prob > χ2
R²

[3]
-

[4]
-

-

-

-

25.644***
(7.841)
-

-4.482***
(1.589)
-

-

-

-

-1.418***
(0.187)
-0.006**
(0.003)
52.134***
(4.208)

-9.150***
(3.066)
-1.418***
(0.187)
-0.006**
(0.003)
70.537***
(9.160)

-1.589***
(0.216)
-0.007**
(0.003)
74.984
(7.186)

-1.589***
(0.216)
-0.007**
(0.003)
51.031***
(3.977)

595 (35)
0.000
0.432

595 (35)
0.000
0.466

425 (25)
0.000
0.244

425 (25)
0.000
0.353

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.
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5.3. Robustness checks
5.3.1. Simulation results for alternative specifications
Although we presented our model for the specific parameters used in our experiments, our findings
apply more generally. In Appendix C, we stress test the model by assessing the robustness of our
main conjecture (1b) according to which markets with the same number of private signals are more
informationally efficient when signals are concentrated in the hands of fully informed traders rather
than dispersed across partially informed traders. We test whether this conjecture holds for different
distributions of the asset value, different cash and share endowments, and for markets populated by
a larger number of traders.
One limitation of our current market setup is that it does not allow traders to mutually gain from
exchange. To address this, we conducted simulations for markets in which traders were assigned
different values for the asset. Thus, mutual gains from exchange can be realized when high-value
traders buy shares from low-value traders. In Appendix C, we report simulation results showing that
allocative efficiency in markets in which traders can mutually gain from exchange is higher when
private information is concentrated in the hands of fully informed traders rather than dispersed across
partially informed traders (see Figure C1). These simulation results thus extend Conjecture 1b.
5.3.2. Mixing partially and fully informed traders
We have shown thus far that our experimental findings are largely consistent with the predictions
of our model. As a robustness test, we ran an additional experiment in which we mixed partially
and fully informed traders. In particular, we consider the case in which the market is populated by
33% (4 out of 12) fully informed, 25% (3 out of 12) partially informed and 42% (5 out of 12)
uninformed traders (‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’). For such a market, our model
simulations predict an average MAD value of 50.78, which is less than the MAD of 59.67 for the
case of 33% fully informed traders and greater than the MAD of 32.55 for the case of 50% fully
informed traders. That is, our model predicts that the level of informational efficiency will only be
slightly improved by adding three partially informed traders to a market populated by four fully
informed traders. In addition, the informational efficiency of the ‘33% fully informed / 25%
partially informed’ treatment is expected to be lower than for the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment.
Our experimental results confirm our model predictions as the informational efficiency of the ‘33%
fully informed / 25% partially informed’ treatment is found to be lower than the informational
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efficiency of the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment, while being only slightly (but not significantly)
higher than the ‘33% fully informed’ treatment (see Table A1 in Appendix A).
As a final consistency check, we confirm a basic prediction of our model according to which
reflective traders systematically earn more than non-reflective traders (see Table A2 in Appendix
A and Appendix B2). These findings are in line with the previous results of Noussair, Tucker and
Xu (2014), Corgnet et al. (2015) and Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2018).
6. Conclusion
What elements of the market institution have the ability to enhance its informational efficiency?
We examine one aspect of the question by building on prior experimental designs to develop an
asset market environment in which the distribution of private information is analyzed.
We derived conjectures based on a learning model with heterogenous agents. In our model,
traders differ in their ability to apply Bayes’ rule to infer private information from market orders.
We define traders as being either reflective or non-reflective depending on whether they use
Bayesian updating or not. Our model shows that, for the same level of aggregate information in a
market, informational efficiency is substantially higher when private information is concentrated
in the hands of a few fully informed traders than when private information is widely dispersed. Our
model also allowed us to test a point prediction according to which markets populated by three
fully informed traders would be more informationally efficient than markets populated solely by
partially informed traders. We confirm these conjectures by comparing the informational
efficiency of experimental asset markets in a series of treatments that only differed in the
distribution of private information. Because we collected data on traders’ cognitive reflection
scores, we were also able to show that, in line with our learning model, markets with a higher
proportion of reflective traders achieved a higher level of informational efficiency. Finally, we
largely confirmed our conjecture that trading volumes should be lower in markets in which the
informational efficiency is predicted to be higher.
Our findings help reconcile different views regarding the informational efficiency of markets by
showing that the extent of the transmission of private information to asset prices crucially hinges
on the distribution of information in the market. Our results suggest that markets in which
information is concentrated in the hands of insiders are more likely to achieve strong-form
efficiency than markets in which this is not the case. This implies the level of informational
efficiency might substantially differ across markets and industries. Future research should
25

investigate further the inability of markets to aggregate highly fragmented information because, as
Hayek (1945, page 520) puts it, the ultimate economic problem considers the “utilization of
knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality”.

7. References
Asparouhova, E. and P. Bossaerts (2017) “Experiments on Percolation of Information in Dark
Markets,” The Economic Journal 127 (605), F518-F544.
Barner, M., Feri, F. and C. Plott (2005) “On the Microstructure of Price Determination and
Information Aggregation with Sequential and Asymmetric Information Arrival in an Experimental
Asset Market,” Annals of Finance 1(1):73-107.
Baron-Cohen, S., Jolliffe, T., Mortimore, C. and M. Robertson (1997) “Another Advanced test of
Theory of Mind: Evidence From Very High Functioning Adults With Autism or Asperger
Syndrome,” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 38, 813-822.
Barreda Tarrazona, I. Grimalda, G; Morone, A., Nuzzo, S. and A. Teglio (2017) “Centralizing
Information Improves Market Efficiency More Than Increasing Information: Results From
Experimental Asset Markets,” Kiel Working Paper, 2072.
Bazerman, M. and W. Samuelson (1983) “I Won the Auction But Don’t Want the Prize,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 27(4), 618-634.
Bossaerts, P. (2009) “What Decision Neuroscience Teaches us About Financial Decision Making,”
Annual Review of Financial Economics 1, 383-404.
Bossaerts, P., Frydman, C. and J. Ledyard (2013) “The Speed of Information Revelation and
Eventual Price Quality in Markets with Insiders: Comparing two Theories,” Review of Finance 18
(1), 1-22
Brennan, M. and H. Cao, H (1996) “Information, Trade, and Derivative Securities,” The Review
of Financial Studies 9(1), 163-208.
Bruguier, A., Quartz, S. and P. Bossaerts (2010) “Exploring the Nature of ‘Trader Intuition’,”
Journal of Finance 65, 1703-1723.
Camerer, C. and K. Weigelt (1991) “Information Mirages in Experimental Asset Markets”,
Journal of Business 64, 463-93.
Campitelli, G., and M. Labollita (2010) “Correlations of Cognitive Reflection with Judgments and
Choices,” Judgment and Decision Making 5, 182-191.
Cason, T. (2000) “The Opportunity for Conspiracy in Asset Markets Organized with Dealer
Intermediaries,” Review of Financial Studies 13, 385-416.
26

Cason, T. and D. Friedman (1996) “Price formation in double auction markets,” Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 20(8), 1307-1337.
Copeland, T. and D. Friedman (1987) “The Effect of Sequential Information Arrival on Asset
Prices: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Finance 42, 763-797.
Copeland, T. and D. Friedman (1991) “Partial Revelation of Information in Experimental Asset
Markets,” Journal of Finance 46, 265-295.
Corgnet, B., DeSantis, M. and D. Porter (2015) “On the Cognitive Foundations of Information
Aggregation in Asset Markets: Reflective Learning & Market Efficiency,” Economic Science
Institute working papers, 15-15.
Corgnet, B., M. DeSantis and D. Porter (2018) “What Makes a Good Trader? On the Role of
Intuition and Reflection on Trader Performance,” Journal of Finance 73(3), 1113-1137.
Corgnet, B., R. Hernan-Gonzalez, P. Kujal and D. Porter (2015) “The Effect of Earned Versus House
Money on Price Bubble Formation in Experimental Asset Markets,” Review of Finance 19 (4), 14551488.
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D. and A. Subrahmanyam (1998) “Investor Psychology and Security
Market Under- and Overreactions,” Journal of Finance 53, 1839-1885.
De Martino, B., O’Doherty, J., Debajyoti, R., Bossaerts, P. and C. Camerer (2013) “In the Mind
of The Market: Theory of Mind Biases Value Computation During Financial Bubbles,” Neuron 79,
1222-1231.
Diamond, D. and R. Verrecchia (1981) “Information Aggregation in a Noisy Rational Expectations
Economy, Journal of Financial Economics,” 9 (3), 221-235.
Easley D. and M. O’Hara (1987) “Price, Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets,”
Journal of Financial Economics 19(1), 69-90.
Esponda, I. (2008), “Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection,” American
Economic Review 98, 1269-1291.
Eyster, E. and M. Rabin (2005) “Cursed Equilibrium,” Econometrica 73(5), 1623-1672.
Eyster, E., Rabin M. and D. Vayanos (2018) “Financial Markets where Traders Neglect the
Information Content in Prices,” Journal of Finance, In Press.
Fama, E. (1970) “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,” The Journal
of Finance 25(2), 383-417.
Fama, E. (1991) “Efficient Capital Markets: II,” The Journal of Finance 46(5), 1575-1617.
Fama, E. (2008) “A Brief History of the Efficient Market Hypothesis,” American Finance
Association speech.
27

Frederick, S. (2005) “Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 19(4), 25-42.
Friedman, D. (1991) “A Simple Testable Model of Double Auction Markets,” Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 15(1), 47-70.
Friedman, D., G. Harrison, and J. Salmon (1984) “The Informational Efficiency of Experimental
Asset Markets,” Journal of Political Economy 92, 349-408.
Frydman, C., Barberis, N., Camerer, C., Bossaerts, P. and A. Rangel (2014) “Using Neural Data
to Test a Theory of Investor Behavior: An Application to Realization Utility,” Journal of Finance
69 (2), 907-946.
Gjerstad, S. and J. Dickhaut (1998) “Price Formation in Double Auctions,” Games and Economic
Behavior 22(1), 1-29.
Glosten, L. and P. Milgrom (1985) “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices In A Specialist Market With
Heterogeneously Informed Traders,” Journal of Financial Economics 4(1), 71-100.
Gode, D. and S. Sunder (1993) “Allocative Efficiency of Markets With Zero-Intelligence Traders:
Market as a Partial Substitute For Individual Rationality,” Journal of political economy 101 (1),
119-137.
Grossman, S. and J. Stiglitz (1980) “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,”
American Economic Review 70(3), 393- 407.
Hanson, R., Oprea, R. and D. Porter (2006) “Information Aggregation and Manipulation in an
Experimental Market,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 60, 449-459.
Hayek, F. (1945) “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35(4), 519530.
Hefti, A., Heinke, S. and F. Schneider (2016) “Mental Capabilities, Trading Styles and Asset
Market Bubbles: Theory and Experiment,” Working Paper, Research Gate.
Hellwig, M. (1980) “On the Aggregation of Information in Competitive Markets,” Journal of
Economic Theory 22(3), 477-498.
Hoppe, E., and D. Kusterer (2011) “Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection,” Economics
Letters 110, 97-100.
Kacperczyk, M., Van Nieuwerburgh, S. and L. Veldkamp (2016), “A Rational Theory of Mutual
Funds' Attention Allocation,” Econometrica 84, 571-626.
Kahneman, D. (2011) “Thinking Fast and Slow,” New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Krahnen, J. and M. Weber (1999) “Does Information Aggregation Depend on Market Structure?,
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 119, 1-22.

28

Krahnen, J. and M. Weber (2001) “Market making in the Laboratory: Does Competition Matter?”
Experimental Economics 4(1) 55-85.
Lesage, E., G. Navarrete, and W. De Neys (2013) “Evolutionary Modules and Bayesian Facilitation:
The Role of General Cognitive Resources,” Thinking & Reasoning 19, 27-53.
Lintner, J. (1969) “The Aggregation of Investor’s Diverse Judgments and Preferences in Purely
Competitive Security Markets,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 4(4), 347-400.
Mondria, J. “Portfolio Choice, Attention Allocation, and Price Comovement,” Journal of Economic
Theory 145, 5, 1837-1864.
Nöth, M. and M. Weber (2003) “Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and
Overconfidence,” Economic Journal 113, 166-189.
Noussair, C. and S. Tucker (2014) “A Collection of Surveys on Market Experiments,” Journal of
Economic Surveys 27(3), 395-397.
Noussair, C., S. Tucker and Y. Xu (2014) “A Futures Market Reduces Bubbles but Allows Greater
Profit for More Sophisticated Traders,” Working Papers in Economics 14/12, University of Waikato,
Department of Economics.
O’Brien, J and S. Srivastava (1991): “Dynamic Stock Markets with Multiple Assets: An
Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Finance 46(5), 1811-1838.
Oechssler, J., Roider, A. and P. Schmitz (2009) “Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases,”
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 72(1), 147-152.
Palan, S. (2013) “A Review of Bubbles and Crashes In Experimental Asset Markets,” Journal of
Economic Surveys 27 (3), 570-588.
Peng, L. and W. Xiong (2006) “Investor Attention, Overconfidence and Category Learning,”
Journal of Financial Economics 80, 563-602.
Plott, C. and S. Sunder (1982) “Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider
Information: An Application to Rational Expectations Models,” Journal of Political Economy 90,
663-698.
Plott, C. and S. Sunder (1988) “Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information
In Laboratory Security Markets,” Econometrica 56, 1085-1118.
Plott, C, Wit, J. and W. Yan (2003) “Parimutuel Betting Markets as Information Aggregation
Devices: Experimental Results,” Economic Theory 22, 311-351.
Rabin, M. (2002) “Inference by Believers in the Law of Small Numbers,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 117(3), 775-816.

29

Sirota, M., M. Juanchich, and Y. Hagmayer (2014) “Ecological rationality or nested sets?
Individual differences in cognitive processing predict Bayesian reasoning,” Psychonomic Bulletin
& Review 21, 198–204.
Stanovich, K. (2009) “What Intelligence Tests Miss: The Psychology of Rational Thought,” Yale
University Press.
Thaler, R. (1988) “Anomalies: The Winner's Curse,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2(1), 191202.
Thaler, R. (1991) “The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life,” New York:
Free Press.
Toplak, M., West, R., and K. Stanovich (2011) “The Cognitive Reflection Test as a Predictor of
Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks,” Memory & Cognition 39, 1275-1289.
Toplak, M., West, R., and K. Stanovich (2014) “Assessing Miserly Information Processing: An
Expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test,” Thinking & Reasoning 20(2), 147-168.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974) “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,”
Science 185, 1124-1131.
Veiga, H., & Vorsatz, M. (2009) “Price Manipulation in an Experimental Asset Market,” European
Economic Review 53 (3), 327-342.
Veiga, H., & Vorsatz, M. (2010) “Information Aggregation in Experimental Asset Markets in The
Presence of a Manipulator,” Experimental Economics 13(4), 379-398.
Vives, X. and L. Yang (2017) “Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices”, Working Paper.
Wilson, R. (1987) “On equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets,” In Arrow and the Ascent of Modern
Economic Theory, Macmillan Press, London, G. Feiwell (Ed.), 375-414.

30

Appendix A. Additional analyses
We present two robustness checks in this appendix. First, Table A1 shows that adding three partially
informed traders to a market populated by four fully informed traders only has a slight impact on the
informational efficiency of the market (see the coefficient of the ‘33% fully informed’ dummy
variable). Moreover, these markets with seven (partially and fully) informed traders do not perform
as well as (with respect to informational efficiency) as markets with six fully informed traders (see
the coefficient of the ‘50% fully informed’). This result holds even when controlling for participants’
CRT scores via the Proportion of reflective traders variable or the Average CRT score variable.
Table A1. Random effects panel regression of MAD values per market as a function of cognitive
reflection and treatment dummies
MAD
Specification:
Dummy ‘33% fully
informed’
Dummy ‘50% fully
informed’

Treatments ‘33% fully informed’, ‘50% fully informed’ and
‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’
[1]
[2]
[3]
3.541
0.785
4.696
(12.279)
(12.618)
(12.139)
-37.472***
(8.997)

-43.038***
(8.102)

-38.910***
(9.354)

Proportion of reflective
traders

-34.650
(38.228)

-

-

Average CRT score in a
session

-

-19.559**
(8.115)

-

-2.545***
(0.732)
0.136***
(0.032)
103.166***
(18.016)

-2.541***
(0.732)
0.136***
(0.032)
139.563***
(16.400)

-2.544***
(0.731)
0.136***
(0.032)
88.725***
(11.909)

340 (20)
0.000
0.173

340 (20)
0.000
0.183

340 (20)
0.000
0.169

Market number
True asset value
Intercept
Observations (sessions)
Prob > χ2
R²

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.

In Table A2, we present our second robustness check which demonstrates that reflective traders
earn more than non-reflective traders when pooling all treatments together (see the positive
coefficient for CRT score). The CRT score is calculated as the number of correct answers of a
31

given trader on the CRT. We also control for theory of mind scores, using the eye gaze test (BaronCohen et al. 1997), to assess subjects’ capacity to infer other’s intentions. In this task, participants
looked at images of people’s eyes and had to choose one of four feelings that best described the
mental state of the person whose eyes were shown. Our theory of mind score is defined as the
number of correct answers to the 36 question, 10-minute test. In line with Bruguier, Quartz and
Bossaerts (2010) and De Martino et al. (2013), Hefti et al. (2016), Corgnet et al. (2018) we find a
positive relationship between trader’s performance and theory of mind scores. We refer to Signal
“Not x” Dummies as dummy variables set to 1 for subjects who received the signal “Not x”. The
“Two signals Dummy” is set to 1 for subjects who received two signals and are thus fully informed.
The Top 25% Reflective Dummy and Top 25% Theory of Mind Dummy variables are set to one
if the participant scored in the top 25% of all participants in this study (across all 35 experimental
sessions) on the CRT or the Theory of Mind Eye Gaze test, respectively, and zero otherwise.
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Table A2. Random effects panel regression of trader earnings as a function of cognitive
reflection and information held by traders
Market earnings (in francs)
All treatments
[1]
100.004***
(27.009)

Top 25% Reflective Dummy
CRT score
Top 25% Theory of Mind Dummy

32.774***
(6.337)

50.917*
(26.543)

-

69.424***
(25.477)
0.609
(1.438)
3.977***
(0.075)
142.048***
(41.064)
-96.761**
(41.620)
151.921***
(28.964)
246.405***
(14.683)

4.414*
(2.720)
60.507**
(25.078)
0.628
(1.438)
3.977***
(0.075)
146.514***
(40.635)
-93.721**
(41.058)
155.379***
(28.443)
246.742***
(14.693)

1,039.539***
(31.723)

890.062***
(81.832)

6,511
0.000
0.660

6,511
0.000
0.662

-

True asset value
Signal “Not 50” Dummy
Signal “Not 240” Dummy
Signal “Not 490” Dummy
Two signals Dummy
Intercept

-

-

Theory of Mind score
Gender Dummy
(1 if male)
Market number

[2]

Observations
Prob > χ2
R²

*p-value<0.10, **p-value<0.05 and ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the trader level in parentheses. Note that the
number of observations is lower than the total number of participants times the number of markets (7,106) because we did not collect
theory of mind scores for three sessions in the ‘100% partially informed’ treatment.
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Appendix B. Model conjectures
B1. The model
B1.1. Model description
This appendix provides a detailed description of the model presented in Section 3. It is based
upon Appendix G in Corgnet et al. (2015) and has been modified to account for informed and
uninformed traders rather than partially informed traders. We assume there are two types, 𝜏𝜏, of
traders. Reflective traders (𝜏𝜏 = 𝑅𝑅) utilize market orders (bids, asks and contract prices) to update

their beliefs of the asset’s value, while non-reflective traders (𝜏𝜏 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) do not update their initial
beliefs. A market order implies an update of the bid-ask spread or a transaction. Each order

corresponds to one of the following events: (1) best bid is accepted; (2) best ask is accepted; or (3)
the bid-ask spread is updated.
Traders will either be informed (i.e., know the true asset value with certainty), 𝑠𝑠 = 𝐼𝐼, or

uninformed (i.e., only know the possible asset values along with their probabilities), 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑈𝑈. 28 We
𝜂𝜂

thus have four possible trader types: 𝜂𝜂 = (𝜏𝜏, 𝑠𝑠) where 𝜏𝜏 ∈ {𝑅𝑅, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁} and s ∊ {U, I}. Let 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛 represent

the belief of a trader of type 𝜂𝜂 after event 𝑛𝑛, which is denoted by {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}. Uninformed reflective

traders update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule with 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {50,240,490} as follows:
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈
, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}�=∑𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃 �𝑣𝑣 = 𝑖𝑖|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}� × 𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1

𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈
where 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
represents their prior belief and 𝑣𝑣 represents the asset value.

This trader updates her belief according to the following formula:

𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 =

𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈
= 𝐸𝐸�𝑣𝑣|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}�

𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈
= 𝑃𝑃�𝑣𝑣 = 50|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}� × 50 + 𝑃𝑃�𝑣𝑣 = 240|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}� × 240 + 𝑃𝑃�𝑣𝑣 = 490|𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}�

× 490

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 50 (𝑛𝑛 − 1)
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 240 (𝑛𝑛 − 1)
=
× 50 +
× 240
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}]
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}]
where

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 490 (𝑛𝑛 − 1)
+
× 490
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}]

The variable 𝑠𝑠 represents the informational type of the trader. In the case of partially informed traders, 𝑠𝑠 identifies
the signal received by the trader, i.e. “Not 50”, “Not 240” or “Not 490”.
28

34

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50] × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 50 (𝑛𝑛 − 1) + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240] × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 240 (𝑛𝑛 − 1) +
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 490 (𝑛𝑛 − 1).

After the (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 event, the uninformed reflective trader believes that the probability the true
asset value is 𝑣𝑣 is given by 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑣𝑣 (𝑛𝑛 − 1).

The term, 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣], i.e. the probability that event 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛) occurred given the asset’s true value

is 𝑣𝑣, must be calculated. The derivation of this term is dependent upon the type of event as well
as the region in which the event occurred. The set of possible prices is the interval 50 through 490
on the real number line, as we restrict bids and asks to this interval which corresponds to lowest

(highest) possible asset value. We subdivide this interval into several subintervals, called regions,
which are delineated by the traders’ beliefs along with the overall interval’s endpoints, 50 and 490.
𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈
Suppose the uninformed reflective trader believes the asset value is 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
= 130. As part of the

learning process, this trader must determine the likelihood of event 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛) occurring assuming the

true asset value is 50, 240 or 490. Suppose this trader assumes the true asset value is 240. Then
this trader assumes that all informed traders know the asset value is 240, while any uninformed
non-reflective traders hold their initial belief of 223.5. 29 In this scenario the interval [50,490]

would be divided into 4 regions: [50,130], [130,223.5], [223.5,240], and [240,490].
Now this trader will update her belief based upon the probability of a particular event occurring
with a particular region. And, this probability is based upon the likelihood of the different traders
acting in each region. Recall that traders submit offers to buy below their belief and offers to sell
above their belief. So, if a reflective trader observes a new offer to buy at 225, then she knows this
could only have been submitted by a fully informed trader with a belief of 240. Let 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )

represent the current best bid (ask) when 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛) occurs, while 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ) represents the improved bid
(ask) corresponding to 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛). 30 We denote the region in which an event occurred by 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 , where 𝑟𝑟 ∈

{𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 } If 𝑟𝑟 = 50 (240) [490] and the trader assumes the asset value is 50 (240) [490],

then region, 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 , will consist of the single point, 50 (240) [490] because the informed traders’ belief

coincides with 𝑟𝑟.

We consider the following three cases characterized by event type.

29

Note that the initial beliefs of reflective and non-reflective traders with the same clue are identical.
Note that 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 ) may not correspond to the (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 bid (ask). Rather, the subscript corresponds to the event
number. Suppose, for example, that the order book contains bids of 75 and 100. The current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , would
be 100. Further, suppose 𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛) corresponds to a trader accepting the 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 = 100. Thus, the new current best bid
would be 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 = 75.
30
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Case 1: the current best bid is traded, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}: = {𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )}

Suppose event 𝑛𝑛 corresponds to the acceptance of the current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 . Then the

conditional probability that event {𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )} occurred, i.e. the current best bid 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 was traded,
given the true asset value is 𝑣𝑣, is
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏

𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛−1

where 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛−1 represents the probability that a trader is willing to sell in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , i.e. the

region in which the (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , resides.

To calculate the probability of selling in region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 we consider the beliefs of four possible

trader types: informed reflective traders, informed non-reflective traders, uninformed reflective

traders, and uninformed non-reflective traders. 31 Suppose 𝑣𝑣 = 50 in the above equation. This
implies that the beliefs of the informed reflective and informed non-reflective traders are 50. The

belief of the uninformed non-reflective traders is 223.5. The probability that a trader is willing to
sell in 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 is 𝜒𝜒 𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 × 𝛼𝛼/2 + 𝜒𝜒 𝜏𝜏,𝐼𝐼 × 1/2 + 𝜒𝜒 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑈𝑈 × (1 − 𝛼𝛼)/2, where 𝜒𝜒 𝜏𝜏,𝑠𝑠 is one if the trader’s

belief is less than or equal to the lower bound of the corresponding region (𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) and zero

otherwise. That is, the uninformed reflective trader calculates the proportion of traders holding a
belief less than or equal to the current best bid. The exogenous parameter 𝛼𝛼 represents the actual

proportion of reflective traders in the market. 32 The proportion of (un)informed non-reflective
traders is represented by (1 − 𝛼𝛼).

Case 2: the current best ask is traded, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}: = {𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )}

Suppose the current best ask, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 , is accepted. Then the conditional probability that event

{𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )} occurred, i.e. the current best ask 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 was traded, given the true value of the asset is
𝑣𝑣, is:

𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎

𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1

where 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 represents the probability that a trader is willing to buy in region 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 .
31

The informed reflective and informed non-reflective types could be consolidated into a single group as neither type
will update its belief given it knows the actual value.
32
Reflective traders assume that other reflective traders share their belief of the proportion of reflective traders in the
market. It is possible that reflective traders’ belief of the proportion of reflective traders in the market is not accurate.
If this proportion is not common information known by all traders, then Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015) consider
the situation in which this proportion is not common information known by all traders. They show this assumption
impacts both the simulation, as well as the experimental, results.
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In this case we determine whether the beliefs of the four different types of traders (η) is greater
𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎

than or equal to the upper bound of the region and add 𝛼𝛼/2 ([1 − 𝛼𝛼]/2) to 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , i.e. we check

if their belief is greater than or equal to the current best ask.

Case 3: both the current best bid and ask are improved, {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}: = {NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) ⋂ NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )}

Suppose neither the current best bid nor the current best ask is traded. Then both the bid and the

ask are updated from the current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , and ask, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 , to the new (improved) best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ,

and ask, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 . Then the conditional probability that event {𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)} = {NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) ⋂ NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )}
occurred, i.e. both the current best bid and the best ask were “not traded” (NT), given the true value
of the asset is 𝑣𝑣, is:

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) ∩ NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )} |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 ]
= 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 ]

[𝑖𝑖]

[𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]

× 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 , NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )]

× 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∩ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 �𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 �

[𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖]

Consider each term in this product separately.

[i] The first term is equivalent to one minus the probability that the current best bid, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , was not
traded. This is equal to one minus the probability that traders are willing to sell in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 .

Thus, we have:

𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏

𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 ) |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 ] = �1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛−1 �.

[ii] The second term may be rewritten as:

𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 , NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )] = 1 − 𝑃𝑃[T(𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 )|𝑣𝑣, NT(𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )]

= 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 |𝑣𝑣, 𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 �
= 1 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 |𝑣𝑣, 𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 �
×

𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 �
𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 �

𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎

𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏

= 1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 /𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1

where we make use of Bayes’ rule as well as the fact that since 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 must lie to the right of (or
possibly

coincide

with)

𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1

on

𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 |𝑣𝑣, 𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 � = 1.
[iii] Finally, the third term may be expressed as:
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the

number

line,

𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ⋂ 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 �𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 � = 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 � × 𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 �
𝛾𝛾 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 � − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 �
��
= �� �
𝜂𝜂
2 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 � − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(50, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )
𝜂𝜂

𝛾𝛾 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 � − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 �
��
× �� �
𝜂𝜂
2 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(490, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 ) − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 �
𝜂𝜂

where the sums are taken over the four trader types, 𝜂𝜂 = (𝜏𝜏, 𝑠𝑠): informed reflective traders,

informed non-reflective traders, uninformed reflective traders, and uninformed non-reflective
traders. As the true value is assumed to be 𝑣𝑣, it is also assumed that the informed traders believe

the true asset value is 𝑣𝑣 in these calculations. In addition, 𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 (𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 ) represents the upper (lower) bound

of the region 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟 , 𝑟𝑟 ∈ {𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 }. The variable 𝛾𝛾 is set to 𝛼𝛼 for reflective trader types and

(1 − 𝛼𝛼) for non-reflective trader types. 33
Thus, we have:

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣] = �1 −

𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏
𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛−1 � ×

�1 −

𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎

𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1

�
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏
𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1

𝛾𝛾 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 � − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 �
��
× �� �
𝜂𝜂
2 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 � − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(50, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛−1 )
𝜂𝜂

𝛾𝛾 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 , 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 � − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 , 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 �
��
× �� �
𝜂𝜂
2 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(490, 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 ) − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛−1
, 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 �
𝜂𝜂

when the 𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡ℎ event is an improvement to the bid-ask spread. 34

B1.2. Model example

We demonstrate the learning model by providing an illustrative example. Suppose there are six
informed traders and four reflective traders, i.e. 𝛼𝛼 = 4/12. For simplicity, assume two of the
reflective traders are informed and two are uninformed. Let the true value of the asset be 50.

Based on their prior information uninformed traders’ initial belief of the true asset value (prior
to the occurrence of any event) is 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 = 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑈𝑈 = 0.35 × 50 + 0.45 × 240 + 0.20 × 490 =
33

When running the simulations described in Section B2, traders are first designated as either informed or uninformed.
Next, the reflective traders are randomly identified. For example, if 𝛼𝛼 = 5/12, then five traders would randomly be
identified as reflective with the remaining seven identified as non-reflective. Thus, it is possible that the number of
reflective traders is not evenly distributed across the informed and uninformed types. However, this more closely
resembles the laboratory environment.
34
Strictly speaking, there exist cases in which only the bid or the ask is improved. However, we assume traders do
not update their beliefs on these unlikely events. These cases occur, for example, when a trader wants to update both
the bid and the ask, but does not have the requisite amount of cash/shares to cover the updated bid/ask as well as any
outstanding bids/asks the trader might have.
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223.5. Informed traders’ initial belief is 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅,𝐼𝐼 = 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝐼𝐼 = 490. The informed traders will not update

their belief of the asset value, while the uninformed reflective traders will. And, while the

uninformed reflective traders know that informed traders exist, they do not know their belief as
they do not know the true asset value. Thus, throughout the updating process, when these traders
calculate the probability of an event occurring given the value (50, 240, 490), they must assume
that the informed traders’ belief coincides with the assumed asset value.
First market event: bid-ask spread {180, 360}
We consider the uninformed reflective traders. Suppose the first trader submits an initial bid and
ask spread of {𝑏𝑏1 = 180, 𝑎𝑎1 = 360}. The uninformed reflective traders will update their belief to
227.3 by applying the following Bayesian formula:
𝑅𝑅
𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛,𝑈𝑈
=

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃50 (𝑛𝑛 − 1)
+

50 +

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}]
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃490 (𝑛𝑛 − 1)

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃240 (𝑛𝑛 − 1)

490

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}]

240

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}]
where n would be one and 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 50 (𝑛𝑛 − 1) × 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240] ×

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 240 (𝑛𝑛 − 1) + 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(𝑛𝑛)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 490 (𝑛𝑛 − 1).

The initial prior probabilities are

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 50 (0) = 0.35, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 240 (0) = 0.45 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 490 (0) = 0.20, respectively.

It remains to calculate 𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣] for 𝑣𝑣 ∈ {50,240,490}. This probability is equal to the

probability that neither the current best bid nor the current best ask was traded given the value 𝑣𝑣. 35

In this case the probability of the {180, 360} bid-ask pair is equal to the following:
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣] = 𝑃𝑃[{NT(𝑏𝑏0 ) ∩ NT(𝑎𝑎0 )} |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0 , 𝑎𝑎0 ]

= 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑏𝑏0 ) |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0 , 𝑎𝑎0 ] × 𝑃𝑃[NT(𝑎𝑎0 )|𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0 , 𝑎𝑎0 , NT(𝑏𝑏0 )] × 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 ∩ 𝑎𝑎1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 �𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0 , 𝑎𝑎0 �

= 𝑃𝑃[ 𝑏𝑏1 > 𝑏𝑏0 |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0 , 𝑎𝑎0 ] × 𝑃𝑃[𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎0 |𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0 , 𝑎𝑎0 , 𝑏𝑏1 > 𝑏𝑏0 ] × 𝑃𝑃�𝑏𝑏1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 ⋂ 𝑎𝑎1 ∈ 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 �𝑣𝑣, 𝑏𝑏0 , 𝑎𝑎0 �

(1)

where the default initial bid, 𝑏𝑏0 , is set to 50 and the default ask, 𝑎𝑎0 , is 490. 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 represent

the regions in which the new bid (180) and new ask (360) reside. We assume all bids and asks,
and hence prices, reside in the interval [50,490]. This interval is then divided into regions
determined by the traders’ beliefs as depicted in Figure B1.

35

As previously noted in Section B1.1, this probability is equal to the product of three terms: (1) probability that the
bid was not accepted given the value 𝑣𝑣, (2) probability that the ask was not accepted given the value 𝑣𝑣 and the event
that the bid was not traded and (3) probability that the new bid and ask lie in their respective regions.
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Figure B1. Representation of traders’ initial beliefs, the first bid-ask improvement event, and the
regions in which the new bid and ask exist. Note that reflective and non-reflective traders hold the
same initial beliefs. Moreover, the regions, 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 and 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 , depend upon the assumed true asset
value.

In words, the probability of the bid-ask improvement given the true value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣 is

equal to the product of the following terms:

[i] The probability that the new bid improves the old bid given the value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣, and
given the old bid-ask pair.

[ii] The probability that the new ask improves the old ask given the value, 𝑣𝑣, the old bid-ask pair
(𝑏𝑏0 , 𝑎𝑎0 ), and that the new bid improves the old bid.

[iii] The probability that the new bid resides in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] and the new ask is in
𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 = [223.5,490] given the value of the asset is 𝑣𝑣 = 50 or 490, and given the old bid-ask

pair. If the asset value is assumed to be 240, then these regions would be 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5]

and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 = [240,490].

We address each term in the product in order. Assume the true value is 50 (240) {490}. The
term [i] is equivalent to one minus the probability that a bid in the region [50,50] ([50,223.5])
{[50,223.5]} was accepted/traded, i.e., one minus the probability of a trader selling in this region,
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏

�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛−1 �. If the value is assumed to be 50, then this region consists of a single point in which
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only informed traders would transact. If the value is assumed to be 240 or 490, then no traders
would trade in this region as their beliefs would be greater than the upper bound of the region.
Thus, reflective traders assess this probability to be 0.5 (0) {0}, which makes this first term equal
to 0.5 (1) {1}.
The term [ii] is equivalent to one minus the ratio of the probability that a trader buys in the region
𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎

𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏

𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎0 to the probability that a trader buys in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏0 , i.e. 1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏0 /𝜌𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏0 . If the asset value is

assumed to be 50, then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏0 = [50,50] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎0 = [223.5,490] and the probability of buying in

each region is 1 and 0, respectively. Indeed, all informed traders would buy in the first region,
while no traders would buy in the second region as all traders’ beliefs would be less than the lower
bound of the region. If the asset value is assumed to be 240, then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏0 = [50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎0 =

[240,490] and the probability of buying in each region is 1 and 0, respectively. If the asset value
is assumed to be 490, then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏0 = [50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎0 = [490,490] and the probability of buying

in each region is 1 and 0.5 (again, all informed traders), respectively. Thus, this second term is
equal to 1 (1) {0.5} given the trader assumes the true value to be 50 (240) {490}.
Finally, the term [iii] consists of a product of two sums. The first sum is the probability of a
trader buying in the region containing the new bid, which is equivalent to the probability that a
trader would submit a bid in that region (i.e., her belief is greater than the upper bound of the
region). The second sum, the probability of a trader selling in the region containing the new ask
given the new bid, is calculated in the same manner (i.e., her belief is less than the lower bound of
the region). The term [iii] is calculated as follows:
𝛾𝛾 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 , 𝑎𝑎0 � − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 , 𝑏𝑏0 �
𝛾𝛾 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑢𝑢𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑎𝑎0 � − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �𝑙𝑙𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 , 𝑏𝑏1 �
�� × �� �
��
�� �
𝜂𝜂
2
2 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(490, 𝑎𝑎0 ) − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇0𝜂𝜂 , 𝑏𝑏1 �
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝜇𝜇0 , 𝑎𝑎0 � − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(50, 𝑏𝑏0 )
𝜂𝜂

𝜂𝜂

where 𝜂𝜂 =( 𝜏𝜏, 𝑠𝑠) with 𝜏𝜏 ∈ {𝑅𝑅, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁} and 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {𝐼𝐼, 𝑈𝑈}. If the trader type being considered involves
reflective (non-reflective) traders, then the variable 𝛾𝛾 is set to 𝛼𝛼 (1 − 𝛼𝛼) (i.e., 𝛾𝛾 =

example).

1
3

for this

To calculate this third term, the trader must account for the beliefs of all four trader types:
uninformed reflective, uninformed non-reflective, informed reflective and informed non-reflective.
Suppose the trader assumes the true asset value is 50. Then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 =

[223.5,490]. This trader then assumes all informed traders hold the belief of 50, while all

uninformed traders hold the belief of 223.5. Note that in this case only uninformed traders could
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have submitted a bid of 180. Thus, the two types of informed traders would be excluded from the
first sum in this third term. Moreover, as the initial beliefs of reflective and non-reflective traders
𝛾𝛾

are identical, we may combine the terms for these types ( +
2

(1−𝛾𝛾)
2

=

4/12
2

+

1 490 − 223.5
1 223.5 − 50
1 490 − 223.5
� �
�� × � �
�+ �
��.
2 490 − 180
2 223.5 − 50
2 490 − 223.5

8/12
2

1

= ) to yield:
2

The probability that this first event occurred given the true asset value is 50 is therefore given by
1 490 − 223.5
1 223.5 − 50
1 490 − 223.5
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50] = 0.5 × 1 × � �
�� × � �
�+ �
�� = 0.23.
2 490 − 180
2 223.5 − 50
2 490 − 223.5

Next, suppose the uninformed reflective trader assumes the true asset value is 240. Then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 =

[50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 = [240,490]. The 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 region differs from the case in which the trader

assumes the value is 50 because the trader now believes that informed traders hold the belief of

240. Note that any trader could have submitted this bid-ask combination. Thus, this third term is
given by (where we again combine the reflective and non-reflective types given their common
initial beliefs):
1 223.5 − 50
1 490 − 240
1 223.5 − 50
1 490 − 240
� �
�+ �
�� × � �
�+ �
��.
2 240 − 50
2 490 − 240
2 223.5 − 50
2 490 − 223.5

The probability that this first event occurred given the true asset value is 240 is therefore given by
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240]

1 223.5 − 50
1 490 − 240
1 223.5 − 50
1 490 − 240
=1×1×� �
�+ �
�� × � �
�+ �
��
2 240 − 50
2 490 − 240
2 223.5 − 50
2 490 − 223.5
= 0.93.

Finally, suppose the uninformed trader assumes the true asset value is 490. Then 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 =

[50,223.5] and 𝑋𝑋𝑎𝑎1 = [223.5,490]. Note that in this case only uninformed traders holding the

belief of 223.5 could submit the ask of 360 as informed traders hold the belief of 490. Thus, this
third term is given by:
1 223.5 − 50
1 223.5 − 50
1 490 − 223.5
� �
�+ �
�� × � �
��.
2 490 − 50
2 223.5 − 50
2 490 − 223.5

The probability that this first event occurred given the true asset value is 490 is therefore given by
1 223.5 − 50
1 223.5 − 50
1 490 − 223.5
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(1)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] = 1 × 0.5 × � �
�+ �
�� × � �
�� = 0.17.
2 490 − 50
2 223.5 − 50
2 490 − 223.5

Note that 0.23 × 0.35 + 0.93 × 0.45 + 0.17 × 0.20 = 0.533. Then, after observing this first

event, the uninformed reflective traders update their belief of the true asset value to:
𝜇𝜇1𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 =

0.23 × 0.35
0.93 × 0.45
0.17 × 0.20
× 50 +
× 240 +
× 490 = 227.3
0.533
0.533
0.533
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Recall that the uninformed non-reflective traders, as well as the informed traders do, not update
their beliefs. Figure B2 shows the traders’ beliefs after this first event.
Second market event: sale at 180
To conclude this descriptive example, suppose the bid of 180 is accepted by the second randomly
selected trader. The uninformed non-reflective trader updates her belief based upon this event by
first calculating the probability of this event occurring given the asset value is 50, 240 or 490,
respectively. That is, this trader calculates the probability that a given trader would be willing to
sell in region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] given the true asset value is 50, 240 or 490, respectively. Note

that this is region is the same for each assumed asset value (see Figure B2). Suppose the asset
value is assumed to be 50. Then, only the informed traders would be willing to sell in this region.

Thus, we have
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏1 )}|𝑣𝑣 = 50] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 = 1/2

as one-half (six) of the traders are informed (two are reflective and four are non-reflective).
If the uninformed non-reflective trader assumes the true asset value is 240, then no trader would
be willing to sell in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] as each trader would hold a belief greater than

the upper bound of this region. Indeed, given the assumption that the true asset value is 240,

informed traders would believe the asset value is 240. And, uninformed reflective traders believe
the asset value is 227.3, while uninformed non-reflective traders believe the asset value is 223.5.
Thus,
𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏1 )}|𝑣𝑣 = 240] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 = 0.

Similarly, if the uninformed non-reflective trader assumes the true asset value is 490, then no
trader would be willing to sell in the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 = [50,223.5] as, again, each trader would hold a

belief greater than the upper bound of this region. Thus,

𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] = 𝑃𝑃[{𝑇𝑇(𝑏𝑏1 )}|𝑣𝑣 = 490] = 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 = 0.

The uninformed non-reflective trader therefore updates her belief according to the formula
𝑅𝑅
𝜇𝜇2,𝑈𝑈

=

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 50]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃50 (1)
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}]

+

50 +

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 240]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃240 (1)

𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}|𝑣𝑣 = 490]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃490 (1)
𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}]
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𝑃𝑃[{𝑒𝑒(2)}]

490

240

𝜇𝜇2𝑅𝑅,𝑈𝑈 =

1/2 × 0.23

1/2 × 0.23

50 +

0 × 0.93

1/2 × 0.23

240 +

0 × 0.17

1/2 × 0.23

490 = 50.

Thus, the uninformed non-reflective trader learns that the true asset value is 50. The new current
best bid would be set to 50 (by default), while the current best ask remains 360. This is the case
because, as in the experiment, we do not clear the order book after a transaction. The simulation
would continue with the random selection of a third trader.

Figure B2. Representation of traders’ updated beliefs after the first event, the trade at a price of
180 (the second event), and the region in which the accepted bid exists. Note that reflective
informed and non-reflective informed traders hold the same belief, while reflective uninformed and
non-reflective uninformed traders hold different beliefs. While the region 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1 will typically
depend upon the assumed true asset value, in this example the region is identical for each assumed
value.

B2. Earnings comparison between reflective and non-reflective traders
As described in Section 3.2 we ran simulations of the model to develop testable conjectures. In
this section we show that the earnings of reflective traders exceed those of non-reflective traders
in markets populated by 50% fully informed traders as well as in markets populated by 100%
partially informed traders.
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For each combination (𝑣𝑣, 𝛼𝛼) with 𝛼𝛼 ∈ {1/12, 2/12, … ,1} we execute 25,000 simulations. Each

simulation is conducted as follows: a randomly selected trader either accepts the current best bid
(ask) or strictly improves the bid-ask spread. 36 Note that any of this trader’s outstanding bids or
asks that do not agree with her current belief (i.e., bids above or asks below her belief) are canceled
before she acts. This is consistent with our experimental setup in which traders can cancel their
own orders. Traders then update their beliefs based upon the event, and the program moves to the
next iteration and restarts the process by randomly selecting a trader. The simulation finishes once
30 transactions have been made or 10,000 iterations have been completed.
The following table provides support for the model’s prediction that reflective traders will earn
more than non-reflective traders. We utilize a stopping criterion of 30 transactions though the
results are robust to alternate criteria (e.g., 5 transactions).
Table B2. Ending wealth for reflective and non-reflective traders in both treatments.
𝛼𝛼
1/12
2/12
3/12
4/12
5/12
6/12
7/12
8/12
9/12
10/12
11/12
1

50% fully informed
Reflective
Non-reflective
2,555.69
2,211.30
2,479.25
2,192.15
2,414.81
2,181.73
2,361.38
2,179.31
2,320.05
2,182.82
2,290.45
2,189.55
2,269.84
2,198.23
2,256.99
2,206.02
2,249.09
2,212.72
2,244.53
2,217.36
2,241.73
2,220.93
2,240.00
na

100% partially informed
Reflective
Non-reflective
2,676.36
2,200.33
2,627.51
2,162.50
2,582.44
2,125.85
2,538.15
2,090.93
2,489.64
2,061.68
2,437.04
2,042.96
2,376.95
2,048.27
2,314.99
2,090.02
2,273.92
2,138.23
2,254.20
2,168.98
2,244.79
2,187.26
2,240.00
na

Appendix C. Robustness checks simulations
C1. Stress tests of the model
To test the robustness of Conjecture 1, we ran additional simulations of our model varying (1) the
number of traders, (2) the traders’ initial endowments, and (3) the asset values and probabilities.
36
Any action by the trader (either acceptance of the current best bid/ask or submission of a new bid and ask) is
conditional upon the trader’s finances. That is, a trader may only submit a new bid (accept the best ask) if she has
enough cash to cover the new bid (accepted ask) plus all of her outstanding bids. Similarly, the trader may only submit
a new ask (accept the best bid) if she has enough shares to cover the new ask (accepted bid) plus all of her outstanding
asks.
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Analogous to Figure C1, the mean absolute price deviation from the true asset value averaged across
25,000 simulations for each asset value is reported in Table C1. Consistent with Conjecture 1b, we
report that markets in which private information is concentrated (50% fully informed) leads to lower
MAD values than markets in which information is dispersed (100% partially informed).
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Table C1.- This table reports the mean absolute price deviation from the true asset value. The reported value
corresponds to the average across 25,000 simulations for each asset value (50, 240 and 490) and value of 𝛼𝛼.

Asset Values
Probabilities
Endowment

Market with twice the
number of traders
[1]
50-240-490

Market with three times more
cash and shares
[2]
50-240-490

0.35-0.45-0.20
1,200 francs, 4 shares

Number of
traders

Market with uniform
distribution of market value
[3]
100-200-300

0.35-0.45-0.20

1/3-1/3-1/3

3,600 francs, 12 shares

1,200 francs, 4 shares

12 traders

12 traders

24 traders

MAD
𝛼𝛼

0
1/24
2/24 (1/12)
3/24
4/24 (2/12)
5/24
6/24 (3/12)
7/24
8/24 (4/12)
9/24
10/24 (5/12)
11/24
12/24 (6/12)
13/24
14/24 (7/12)
15/24
16/24 (8/12)
17/24
18/24 (9/12)
19/24
20/24 (10/12)
21/24
22/24 (11/12)
23/24
1

100%
partially
informed

50% fully
informed

148.81
147.24
145.27
142.86
139.85
136.21
132.06
127.21
121.79
115.75
109.30
102.43
95.30
87.92
79.85
72.22
64.47
57.40
51.90
46.11
41.54
37.40
33.35
28.98
22.18

94.26
85.37
76.32
67.50
59.56
51.77
44.31
38.12
32.41
27.29
23.10
19.31
16.23
13.73
11.78
10.10
8.88
7.85
7.09
6.49
5.89
5.42
5.03
4.73
4.44

100%
partially
informed

50% fully
informed

100%
partially
informed

50% fully
informed

137.25

88.67

62.84

35.67

131.59

70.96

58.75

28.47

125.27

55.26

53.92

22.32

116.55

42.19

48.80

17.08

103.91

31.54

43.49

12.94

86.91

23.14

36.61

9.58

67.43

16.96

28.40

6.98

48.44

12.47

20.71

5.27

33.07

9.35

15.42

3.93

22.62

7.21

10.48

3.10

16.33

5.94

7.95

2.53

12.35

5.04

5.07

2.12

8.99

4.40

6.33

1.95

C2. Allocative efficiency
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We use simulations to assess the effect of concentrating information in the hands of insiders in lieu
of distributing evenly across traders on the allocative efficiency of markets (see Conjecture 1b). To
that end, we simulate markets in which the value of the asset differs across traders (see Plott and
Sunder 1988, Series A). In particular, we consider three possible states of the world denoted X, Y
and Z. In state X (Y) [Z], the asset value is equal to 100 (240) [300] francs for one-half of the traders
and 290 (190) [160] for the other half (see Corgnet et al. 2018b). In these private values simulations,
we used the same trading rules and number of traders as in the main treatments with the exception
that traders were endowed with 1,500 francs and 3 shares of the asset.
To measure the allocative efficiency of a market, we follow Plott and Sunder (1988) and Corgnet
et al. (2018b) by comparing the sum of asset payouts received by all traders in a given market (Actual
Payouts) with the payouts which would have been made if traders knew the state of the world (Max
Payouts). More specifically, we assess the extent to which a market allocation of shares improves
upon the no-trade allocation. We then calculate our efficiency measure as: Allocative Efficiency ≔
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁˗𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁˗𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃

, where the No-trade Payouts are those obtained by traders when they

keep their initial portfolio (without making a trade). Below, we represent the average allocative
efficiency (across all possible proportions of reflective traders in the market) for markets with 100%
partially informed traders and for markets with 50% fully informed traders. We show that allocative
efficiency is higher when the market is populated by fully informed traders rather when the market
is only populated by partially informed traders.
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Figure C1. Allocative efficiency simulations for markets with 100% partially informed traders
and for markets with 50% fully informed.
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Appendix D. Survey
Cognitive reflection test (CRT) (5 minutes)
Taken from Frederick (2005):
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? ____ cents
[Correct answer: 5 cents; intuitive answer: 10 cents]
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines
to make 100 widgets? ____ minutes
[Correct answer: 5 minutes; intuitive answer: 100 minutes]
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake? ____ days
[Correct answer: 47 days; intuitive answer: 24 days]
Taken from Toplak et al. (2014):
(4) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in
12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? _____ days
[correct answer: 4 days; intuitive answer: 9]
(5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many
students are in the class? ______ students
[correct answer: 29 students; intuitive answer: 30]
(6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90.
How much has he made? _____ dollars
[correct answer: $20; intuitive answer: $10]
(7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after
he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for
Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this
point, Simon has: a. broken even in the stock market, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has
lost money
[correct answer: c; intuitive response: b]
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Theory of the mind Test (10 minutes)
This is an example of the 36 questions in the test of Baron-Cohen et al. (1997):

Figure D1. Example of an eye gaze test question
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Appendix E. Market figures

The average price per market period is listed at the top of each subfigure, and the true asset value is
denoted at the bottom of each subfigure. Each transaction is denoted by a red dot. The rational
expectations value is indicated by a horizontal line, and the Walrasian model value is indicated by a
dashed line.
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Figure 1.1. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 1.

Figure 1.3. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 3.
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Figure 1.2. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 2.

Figure 1.4. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 4.
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Figure 1.5. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 5.

Figure 1.7. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 7.
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Figure 1.6. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 6.

Figure 1.8. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 8.
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Figure 1.9. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 9.

Figure 1.10. ‘100% partially informed’ Session 10.
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Figure 1.11. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 1.

Figure 1.12. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 2.

Figure 1.13. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 3.

Figure 1.14. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 4.
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Figure 1.15. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 5.

Figure 1.16. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 6.

Figure 1.17. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 7.

Figure 1.18. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 8.
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Figure 1.19. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 9.

Figure 1.20. ‘50% fully informed’ Session 10.

Figure 1.21. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 1.

Figure 1.22. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 2.
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Figure 1.23. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 3.

Figure 1.24. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 4

Figure 1.25. ‘17% fully informed’ Session 5.

Figure 1.26. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 1.
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Figure 1.27. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 2.

Figure 1.28. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 3.

Figure 1.29. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 4.

Figure 1.30. ‘25% fully informed’ Session 5.
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Figure 1.31. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 1.

Figure 1.32. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 2.

Figure 1.33. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 4.

Figure 1.34. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 4.
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Figure 1.36. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’
Session 1.

Figure 1.35. ‘33% fully informed’ Session 5.

Figure 1.37. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’
Session 2.

Figure 1.38. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’
Session 3.
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Figure 1.39. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’
Session 4.

Figure 1.40. ‘33% fully informed / 25% partially informed’
Session 5.
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Appendix O1. Instructions (online appendix)
We display the screenshots for the ‘50% fully informed’ treatment.
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